In the Dutch Postcode Lottery a postal code 19 households on average) is randomly selected weekly, and prizescash and a new BMW -are awarded to lottery participants in that postal code. On average, this generates a temporary, unexpected income shock equal to about eight months of income for about one third of the households in a winning code, while leaving the incomes of non-winning, neighboring households unaffected. We find that the effects on winners are largely confined to cars and other durables; the effects on neighbors are confined to cars, and are highly localized. Relative to the modest effects of the lottery prizes on winners' consumption choices (consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis), the effects on neighbors are substantial.
Introduction
Economic theory offers a rich set of predictions concerning the effects of income shocks on household behavior, both 'own' effects (effects on those whose income is subject to the shock) and social effects (effects on those whose own income does not change, but who might be affected indirectly). A classical own effects prediction is the Permanent Income Hypothesis (liquidity-unconstrained households should save the lion's share of an income shock). A second one is that households who receive the shock as an in-kind transfer (such as food stamps) should in most cases treat it as cash. Examples of social effects include Veblen effects (shocks to neighbors' incomes might generate changes in conspicuous consumption) and the Easterlin hypothesis (positive shocks to neighbors' incomes might reduce one's happiness).
To date, empirical testing of all the above hypotheses has been hampered by the lack of credibly exogenous variation in either a household's own income, or in the income of its neighbors. Recently, however, progress regarding own effects was made by using a sample of lottery winners (Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote 2001) and by exploiting the random timing of income tax rebates (Agarwal, Liu and Souleles 2007) . Regarding social and neighborhood effects, a number of recent studies have used plausibly exogenous variation in social groups as a source of identification, including Sacerdote (2001) , Cipollone and Rosolia (2007) and the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) studies (Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001; Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschfeld 2001; Kling, Ludwig and Katz 2005) . With one recent exception, however (Angelucci and De Giorgi 2009 ), these studies do not focus on consumption behavior. We are aware of no naturalexperimental evidence concerning the effects of in-kind transfers on consumption decisions.
In this paper we contribute to both the own effects and social effects literatures using data from the Dutch Postcode Lottery (PCL). Each week, this lottery allocates a prize to participants in a randomly chosen postcode (containing 19 households on average). More than one quarter of the Dutch population participates in the lottery. A participant wins €12,500 per ticket. In addition, one participating household in the winning postcode receives a new BMW. From an experimental design perspective, the lottery provides PCL participants in the winning code with an unexpected temporary 2 income shock equal on average to about eight months of income, while leaving all other households' incomes unchanged. 1 Our survey data includes information on consumption and happiness for four groups of households: lottery participants and nonparticipants in winning and in nearby non-winning postcodes. Given the inherent randomness in the prize draws and absent externalities between winning and non-winning postcodes, participants in non-winning postcodes constitute a valid counterfactual for participants in winning postcodes. This allows us to test for the effects of unexpected, temporary income shocks (both cash and in kind) on winning households' consumption (and happiness)
under quite general conditions.
Similarly, under the above conditions nonparticipants in non-winning postcodes constitute a valid counterfactual for nonparticipants in winning postcodes. This allows for a clean test for social effects of unexpected, temporary income shocks (both cash and in kind) on non-participating households' consumption (and happiness). A noteworthy feature of our analysis of social effects is its partial-population design, in which a subset of the members of a fixed peer group receives an exogenous shock. Unlike what Moffitt (2001) calls group-changing interventions (where subjects are moved to a new peer group), partial population designs are not contaminated by the causal effects of mobility itself. Partial population designs have recently been used to estimate the extent of information dissemination and learning among neighbors and friends (Duflo and Saez 2003; Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2004; Miguel and Kremer 2004) and peer effects in school participation (Bobonis and Finan 2009; Lalive and Cattaneo 2009) .
A potentially 'ideal' partial population design starts with a sample of social groups (say villages) assumed to be isolated from one another (so there are no crossvillage externalities). Next, a number of villages are randomly assigned to be 'treatment 1 Compared to Agarwal et al. (2007) , the income shocks we observe are much larger; in addition we have significant detail about the distribution of expenditures across types of consumption and (self-reported) information on other household income. Limitations compared to Agarwal et al.' s data are a smaller sample size and less information on the timing of expenditure responses to income shocks. A distinction is that the income shocks in our experiment were almost surely unexpected by their recipients. Compared to Imbens et al.'s (2001) study of lottery winners, we have a larger sample and more detail on types of consumption expenditures. In contrast to their data, randomization in our lottery is over postcodes instead of tickets; as a result, the (neighborhood) characteristics of households in winning and non-winning postcodes are likely to be more similar. Most of our income shocks are smaller than theirs, and temporary. Unlike Imbens et al., we do not have information about our households later than six months after the lottery win. Most, if not all, actual studies of social effects differ from the above ideal in some way. For example, in a well-known study of health-related interventions, Miguel and Kremer (2004) randomize treatment eligibility across groups (in their case Kenyan schools), but cannot control individuals' treatment takeup decisions within schools.
Thus, while they can identify the effects of school-level treatment on the entire school (inclusive of social interactions between treated and nontreated children), they are forced to rely on nonexperimental methods to identify within-school social effects.
Like Miguel and Kremer, our paper differs from the ideal design in that, rather than being randomly assigned to treatment within social groups, individuals in our data choose whether to take up treatment or not. A crucial distinction, however, is that in our Most related to our study is Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) , which is to our knowledge the first study of social effects in household consumption using a partialpopulation design. Using data from a program that targets poor households in small rural communities in Mexico with bimonthly conditional grants to improve education, health and nutrition, they find strong evidence of positive program externalities to non-eligible households through changes in informal insurance and credit markets. Treatments are randomized over villages. Each village contains eligible (poor) and non-eligible (nonpoor) households, and eligibility is a nonrandom event based on a household's poverty status. Estimates of the average treatment effects (ATEs) and social or indirect treatment effects (ITEs) are obtained by comparing mean observed outcomes for the poor (nonpoor) in treatment and control villages. 4 Thus, their design is analogous to ours, with pre-program income playing the same role as PCL participation in our study.
In addition to simple comparisons between winning and non-winning codes, we present estimates from a regression-based approach that accounts for differences in treatment intensity (i.e. amounts won, both in the household and in its vicinity), and explores the sensitivity of our results to a wide range of alternative specifications of a household's social comparison group, such as its two and four nearest neighbors and the set of other households within 25 meters. The regression framework also allows us --at the cost of some additional assumptions--to identify some additional quantities (such as pure 'own' effects of lottery income shocks on participants) in addition to the above ATE and ITE.
Our estimated effects of lottery winnings on winners are consistent with theories of in-kind transfers (e.g. Moffitt 1984 Moffitt , 1989 : we find that the vast majority of BMW winners do not own a BMW six months after the lottery. Consistent with a simple life-3 Our design does not, however, yield an experimental estimate of the effects of neighbors' lottery winnings on PCL participants. Heterogenous treatment effects between the treated and nontreated may however be less of a concern in our context than in cases where individual selection into treatment occurs after group randomization, since in the latter case we would expect persons who expect to benefit most from the treatment to select into it (and those who benefit most from spillovers, e.g. from others' immunizations, to select out of it). In our case, it is hard to think of a reason why neighbors' income shocks would have a larger effect on the consumption of PCL nonparticipants than on the consumption of participants. 4 As in Miguel-Kremer, individuals in Angelucci and De Giorgi's design who are eligible based on their income could in priniciple fail to sign up for the program. This turns out to rare in practice, however.
cycle model of consumption, we do not detect any effect of winning the postcode lottery on most components of winning households' expenditures, including food at home, transportation, and total monthly outlays. However, we do find effects on car expenditures and other durable expenditures of winners. These effects are consistent with a version of the life-cycle consumption model in which households adjust the timing of durables purchases to smooth consumption (Browning and Crossley 2009) or a model with self-imposed borrowing constraints (Shefrin and Thaler 1988) .
Turning to social effects, we detect statistically significant effects of lottery prizes on the car consumption of neighbors of winners. For example, having an immediate neighbor win the PCL raises the probability that a household will buy a car in the next six months by close to 7 percentage points and reduces the mean age of its main car at the survey date by half a year (about a 7 percent decline). Relative to the modest effects of the lottery prizes on the consumption choices of winning households, these effects on neighbors are large.
The Dutch Postcode Lottery and the Street Prize
The Nationale Postcode Loterij (PCL) is the second largest national lottery in the In the PCL the lottery ticket number is the participant's 6-digit postcode. Thus, conditional on purchasing a ticket, a household's probability of winning the PCL in any given week is approximately equal to one divided by the number of postcodes in the Netherlands (about 430,000). The popularity of the PCL is sometimes attributed to its potential to induce regret among nonparticipants (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2004) ; nonparticipants living in a winning code know for sure that they would have won had they purchased a ticket. Moreover, the weekly award of prizes is widely publicized in the media, including -in most cases -a broadcast on national television around 10 pm on Sunday evenings. This five-minute program features happy winners and, occasionally, less happy non-winners.
During our sample period, participants paid from €6.25 to €6.75 per ticket (the price increased during the sample period), which is debited monthly from their bank account. There are no restrictions on the number of lottery tickets that can be purchased per participant. The PCL awards several prizes, ranging from very large ones (around €10 million, once or twice a year) to very small ones. 5 In this paper we focus on one particular prize, the weekly Street Prize. If a postcode is selected as the winning code, a prize of €12,500 per lottery ticket is awarded to participants living in that postcode. Net of the 25% lottery tax, which is applied to all lottery prizes larger than €454, this amounts to €9,375 during our sample period. Because randomization is over postcodes instead of tickets, the number of tickets owned does not affect the probability of winning, only the amount won conditional on winning.
In addition to the monetary prizes, one of the Street-Prize winners wins a new BMW. The BMW winner is chosen by randomly selecting one of the winning lottery tickets. In contrast to the monetary prizes, the probability of winning the BMW does increase with the number of tickets held. BMW winners have the option of receiving the cash value of the BMW in lieu of the car itself. This however involves a substantial tax penalty, since the PCL authority pays the 25% lottery tax for winners who accept the BMW in kind, but not for those who choose the cash equivalent (about €25,000). Of course, winners also have the option of selling their new BMW, and incurring any associated transactions costs. 
Econometric Framework
As mentioned, our data is a sample of households living in winning postcodes, as well as in neighboring, nonwinning postcodes. Throughout our discussion, we refer to a winning postcode plus all the non-winning nearby codes associated with it as a "codegroup". In addition to being part of a codegroup CG(i) and a postcode PC(i) (with
, we define for each household i its assumed social comparison group N(i). 
Effects on Winners
Define C 1i as the consumption of household i in a winning postcode (W i =1) if a prize would fall in its postcode; similarly, C 0i is the consumption of a household if no prize would fall in its postcode. Observed consumption equals
We consider the effect of living in a winning postcode on the consumption of lottery participants. The average treatment effect on participants is given by:
The data do not reveal the potential consumption in the absence of the treatment for participants in winning codes. We assume that the value of this expectation is the same as the potential consumption in the absence of prizes for participants in non-winning codes:
Under Assumption 1, the difference
identifies the ATE. We note here that the ATE, or the effect of living in a winning code on PCL participants, includes (in addition to the 'own' effects of winning money) any social effects deriving from other winning households in the postcode; in this sense the ATE does not identify 'pure' own effects of lottery winnings (unless, of course, social effects are zero, which is the implicit assumption in essentially all other studies of own income shocks and consumption). As noted, Section 7 isolates pure own effects by imposing some additional structure.
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Effects on Neighbors of Winners
Similarly, the average indirect effect of the lottery prize on non-participating households is given by:
Under random assignment of prizes, the expected consumption in the absence of a prizewin is equal for winning and non-winning postcodes, that is:
Analogous to the case for participants, under Assumption 2, the difference
identifies the ITE. Since our sampling frame is based on addresses six months after the lottery, our sample would be nonrepresentative if households' propensity to move out of a postcode depends on whether that code (or household) won the PCL. We examined this question directly using the Cadastre and Public Register Agency data on house sales, finding no significant difference in the number of home sales after the PCL prize draw between winning and non-winning addresses (results reported on the paper's website).
The street addresses of all respondents to our survey are known. Identification of social effects is however facilitated if we know the location of all lottery winners in the winning codes surveyed, including those winners who did not respond to our survey. The coordinates (in meters) for all addresses in the postcodes in our sample, plus those of all the lottery winners as reported by the PCL administrators.
In this data, addresses within the same building have the same (x, y) coordinates.
Thus, within buildings, our 'neighbor' variable based on the unit number might be a superior measure of proximity to winners than that based on (x, y) coordinates. One might argue that physical visibility or social distance is more relevant to peer effects than Euclidian distance. Our choice of the latter is guided by data availability.
By definition, a postcode can only be a winning code if it contains at least one household that purchased a PCL ticket; non-winning codes do not have so satisfy this criterion to be in our sample. As a result, in our sample, the PCL participation rate in winning codes is significantly higher than in non-winning codes (0.32 versus 0.26; p = .003). The difference becomes smaller and statistically insignificant in a linear probability model that controls for codegroup fixed effects and respondent characteristics (see the paper's website). To check whether this phenomenon affects our results, we redid the full analysis restricting the sample to postcodes that contain at least 16 addresses (also on the paper's website). In these postcodes, the probability that no one participates in the PCL is smaller than 1 percent. 8 Our main results remained unchanged. Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics for the households in our survey. In addition to providing a statistical portrait of our respondents before the 'treatment', Table   1 provides a test of the exogeneity of the lottery win by comparing lottery participants and nonparticipants in winning versus non-winning postcodes. 9 If winning postcodes are randomly selected, if the decision to respond to our survey is independent of whether the code was a winning one, and if households' reporting of their own consumption behavior is not affected by living in a winning postcode, there should be no statistically significant differences between the two columns of estimated linear probability models of living in a winning code as a function of all the variables in Table 1 , separately for PCL participants and nonparticipants. 11 In neither case could we reject the hypothesis that all of the coefficients in the regression (but the constant) were zero (p=0.2771 for participants, p=0.9012 for nonparticipants). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on awareness of and participation in the postcode lottery and on amounts won. In both winning and non-winning postcodes, all participating households say they remember that a PCL Street Prize was awarded in that code six months after the fact. Awareness among nonparticipants is significantly higher in winning postcodes than in non-winning codes. Both for participants and nonparticipants, those living in the winning postcode do recall the number of households who won, and report house numbers of at least some of these winners significantly more often than their counterparts in the neighboring non-winning codes do (for example, for nonparticipants the numbers are 42 vs. 17 percent and 20 vs. 4 percent, respectively).
Such high awareness levels would seem to be conducive to social effects.
The next two sections of Table 2 provide information on PCL ticket ownership and winnings. The average PCL participant held about 1.8 tickets; the average amount won was €18,596. After the 25% lottery tax, these winnings correspond to about €13,947, or about 7 months of post-tax income for a typical Dutch household. 11.2 percent of ticket owners in winning codes won a BMW. Adding in the expected value of this BMW (we value the BMW at €25,000), the average amount won by a household in the PCL rises to €13,947 + .112(€25,000) = €16,047, or about 8 months of income for an average family in our sample.
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The remainder of Table 2 presents a variety of indicators of the amount of lottery winnings that took place in the geographical vicinity of a typical household in our data.
According to our data, in winning codes, just under half of PCL nonparticipants lived next door to a PCL winner. 13 The average amount won by a PCL nonparticipant's two immediate neighbors (combined) was €12,552. Both of these numbers were somewhat higher among PCL participants; this may reflect social interactions in ticket holdings. For an average non-winning household living in a winning code, 2.4 winning households lived in the same building (and were thus assigned the same (x, y) location) and 2.9
winning households lived within 25 meters. A typical non-winning household in a winning code shared that code with 7.8 winning households who won a total of €199,842 between them. In principle, a household in (but at the boundary of) a non-winning code could live next door to a PCL winner; our method of identifying neighbors will not capture these households. Households living in nonwinning codes but close to winners are, however, included in our Euclidean-distance-based measures of proximity to winners.
Effects of Lottery Prizes on Winners
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households use the timing of durables purchases to smooth consumption), or with 'mental accounting' models with self-imposed borrowing constraints (Shefrin and Thaler 1988) .
In addition, Table 3 shows some significant differences in car ownership between winning and non-winning codes six months after the lottery date. For example, the main car of participating households in winning codes is on average thirteen months newer than in non-winning households. 16 PCL winners are also somewhat more likely than nonwinners to donate the fee they receive for completing our survey to charity.
Since BMWs are a prize in the PCL, it is of interest to look specifically at BMW ownership six months after the lottery. The results for BMW ownership are clear: six months after the lottery, participating households in winning codes are statistically no more likely to own a BMW than participating households in non-winning codes. Thus it appears that most BMW winners either elected to receive the cash prize in lieu of the BMW or sold their BMWs shortly after they received them. To explore this result further, the bottom panel of Table 3 provides additional details on post-PCL BMW ownership. It shows that 25 BMW winners responded to our survey. Of these, only four, or 16 percent, still owned a BMW at the survey date. 17 While this percentage of BMWs is more than one would expect in a random sample of Dutch households, overall the behavior of the BMW winners in our sample is remarkably consistent with simple models of in-kind transfers (see for example Moffitt 1984 Moffitt , 1989 : whenever a gift in kind would induce a suboptimal consumption mix (as a new BMW is likely to do for the vast majority of Dutch households), that gift should, if possible, be converted into its cash equivalent, and either spent on other items or saved.
15 The 'occasional' expenditure amounts (including vacations and non-car durables) in Table 3 are not directly comparable to the pre-lottery levels in Table 1 because the latter refer to the 18-month period preceding the lottery date in one's codegroup. 16 To avoid the possibility that this is simply the mechanical consequence of the fact that cars (specifically BMWs) were a prize in the PCL, all BMW winners have been excluded from this sample. 17 Our survey collects information on a maximum of two cars per household. Could a significant number of BMW winners still own a BMW as their third, or higher-order car? For 18 of the 25 BMW winners, this is impossible, since they own either zero or one car at the survey date. Of the remaining 7 households, two report owning a BMW at the survey date. Thus at the very most, 5 BMWs could be missing from our sample for this reason. Since owning more than two cars is very rare in the Netherlands, the true number is likely much smaller.
Effects of Lottery Prizes on Neighbors of Winners
The difference between the entries in columns 4 and 2 provides the empirical analogue to the ITE described by equation (4). We do not find significant differences in consumption for any of the monthly or non-car durable expenditures. Among nonparticipants, those who live in winning codes are less likely to play the PCL six months later. The regret aspect of the PCL combined with a "lightning never strikes (the same postcode) twice" misperception might provide an explanation: Having observed the "losers" in their neighboring winning postcode, nonparticipants in non-winning codes may feel a strong urge to "insure" against non-winning through participation. Witnessing one's postcode-mates win the PCL does not make non-winning households any less happy six months after the fact. However, Table 3 also shows that nonparticipants in winning codes are significantly more likely (24 versus 17 percent) to buy a car in the six months after the lottery date, to own more cars at the survey date, and to own more total car efficiency units at the survey date.1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Of all our consumption indicators cars are (a) likely to be the most visible to one's residential neighbors, and (b) durable. Unlike an expensive party or vacation which only happens once, a household's neighbors are continuously reminded of its new car after it has been purchased. This leads us to conduct a more detailed analysis of social effects of lottery winnings on car consumption, using simple comparisons that take the best possible advantage of the exogenous assignment of lottery winnings in our sample. Table   4 presents simple means of our four car consumption indicators for three subgroups of nonparticipants: those who live in non-winning codes, those who live in winning codes but do not live next door to a PCL winner (these households will be affected by any postcode-wide social effects on car consumption), and those who do live next door to a PCL winner (who are affected both by postcode-wide social effects and those stemming from their immediate neighbors). In addition to our car consumption measures, the second row of Table 4 asks -as a falsification test -whether a household acquired one of its currently-owned vehicles in the six months before (rather than after) the lottery.
Clearly, all indicators of car consumption in Table 4 except row two are largest (smallest for car age) for households living next door to PCL winners. To the extent that, within postcodes, living next door to a PCL ticket holder is exogenous, Table 4 provides convincing evidence that (a) social effects of winning the PCL do exist, but (b) they are highly localized, restricted in large part to a household's nearest neighbors. Table 5 extends the analysis of Table 4 by addressing the possible endogeneity of living within one or two doors of a PCL winner. If living next door to a PCL winner is not exogenous (which in our framework would require unobserved household characteristics to be correlated within postcodes at the extremely detailed level of nextdoor neighbors), Table 4 's estimates could be biased. To address this concern, Table 5 uses information from our survey to construct an indicator of whether a household lives next door to a PCL participant. As already noted, this indicator is necessarily incomplete because it is survey-derived. In particular, to be in the sample for columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 , a survey household must have had at least one of its two nearest neighbors respond to the PCL survey and at least one of those neighbors must report holding a PCL ticket in our survey. That said, by construction, all the households in the Table 5 sample live next door to a known PCL ticket owner; the only variation in whether their neighbors have PCL winnings is generated by the random selection of winning codes. As the Table   makes clear, all indicators of current car consumption with the exception of the 'placebo' measure in row 2 are higher (lower for car age) for those households who were exposed to the treatment of having a next-door neighbor win the PCL. Sample sizes are small, however, and only one of the comparisons is statistically significant, at the 10% level. In columns 3 and 4 we replicate this analysis, expanding the sample to nonparticipating households who live within two doors of a known PCL participant. Both sample size and statistical significance now increase.
Regression results
In this section we specify and estimate a simple regression model of consumption in the presence of lottery winnings. These regressions control for codegroup fixed effects and for differences in observed pre-lottery household characteristics (including income) 18 Our efficiency units measure combines information on both the number and quality of cars owned by the household at the survey date. A car that is less than one year old is defined as one efficiency unit; all other that are present despite randomization, thereby increasing statistical precision. The regression approach also facilitates using alternative definitions of a household's social comparison group (see Table 2 ) and information on the intensity of treatment (amount of winnings). Our regression framework also generates estimates of the pure 'own' effects of lottery winnings on consumption, and relates these estimates to the ITEs and ATEs estimated in the preceding sections.
Specifically, we assume a household's consumption is given by: 19 We define β in (5) as the own effect of lottery winnings, and γ as the social effect. Both of these coefficients are related in a straightforward way to the ITE and ATE estimated in the previous section; specifically, the ITE is proportional to γ, while the ATE (the effect of winnings on winners) is a linear combination of γ and β (since winners are exposed to income shocks among their neighbors as well).
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Finally, the regression approach facilitates the testing of some simple hypotheses in the theory of consumption. For example, according to the life cycle model, households' consumption decisions should be more strongly linked to their own nonlottery income than to own lottery winnings, because the former contains a larger cars owned by the household are depreciated by 15% per year. 19 An alternative specification of (5) would have own consumption depend not on neighbors' income but on neighbors' consumption (i.e. that social effects are endogenous, not exogenous). In this paper we focus on the latter, for three reasons. Most obviously, shocks to neighbors' incomes are randomly assigned in our context; changes in their consumption are not. Second, households' consumption is multidimensional, which makes it far from clear how to best model consumption interdependencies. (Does my propensity to buy a car depend on your purchase of a specific model and quality of car, on your decision to purchase any car, on the fact that you recently made a visible purchase of any kind, or simply on the fact that you won some money?). Third (and related), effects of neighbors' consumption and income on a household's own consumption are, in general, not separately identified by a neighbor's-income instrument. (5) into (2) and (4) reveals that, under Assumptions 1 and 2, the ATE and ITE can be expressed, respectively, as ITE = WIN will depend not only on whether the postcode was a winner, but on the number of households it contains and their propensity to own PCL tickets; these are nonrandom factors that might be correlated with a household's consumption decisions. We rely on codegroup fixed effects to control for such factors, but also remark that, as already noted, (a) our results are not sensitive to controls for postcode size, and (b) PCL ticket ownership in our sample is very similar between winning and nonwinning postcodes, 18 especially within codegroups. We also show below that our results are not sensitive to codegroup fixed effects, suggesting that spatial correlation of unobservables does not play a large role in the relationships we identify here.
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Own Effects of Lottery Winnings
Row 1 of Table 6 reports our estimates of β, based on equation (5). Coefficients in this row represent the effects of winning €10,000 on the outcome variable in question; each column of the table corresponds to a different regression (the full specification is described in Table 6 ). According to Table 6 , winning the PCL -now (in contrast to the ATE) controlling for being near other winners--has few detectable direct effects on monthly and occasional expenditure categories, including food at home, transportation expenditures, other monthly expenditures, and total monthly expenditures. Own effects are, however, found for various aspects of car consumption. For example, winning €10,000 appears to reduce the average age of a household's main car by about 0.4 years six months after the lottery date, and to raise expenditures on non-car durables by €310.
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Winning the PCL has no effect on a household's reported happiness six months after the event. Contrary to the simple results for winners in Table 3 (which reflect a combination of own and social effects), greater lottery winnings do not raise the likelihood that a household will donate its fee for completing our survey to charity.
Compared to lottery winnings -which are temporary and unexpected -crosssectional income differences should have a substantially larger permanent component.
As noted, the life-cycle model of consumption thus predicts that they should be more strongly related to current expenditures than are lottery winnings, at least for nondurables. While this is true for most of our point estimates, the only statistically 23 Another remedy for possible unobserved differences in neighbors' ticket holdings is to time-difference our consumption measures within households; this is possible for some of our consumption indicators where we have (retrospective) information referring to the period before the lottery win. While recall bias is a concern with these estimates, they are largely similar to our main results. See the previous version of this paper (Kuhn et al, 2008) . 24 Comparing these estimates to the ATEs in Table 3 suggests that own effects account for most, if not all, of those ATEs. In particular, according to Table 6 the estimated pure own effects of winning €18,000 (the mean amount won by PCL participants) on car age, car efficiency units and non-car durables are -.723, .069 and €558 respectively. These compare to ATEs of -1.114, .078, and €533 respectively. Thus, only a PCL winner's car age (i.e. the size of its car quality 'upgrade') appears to be affected by social effects acting on PCL winners. significant differences between the effects of lottery and nonlottery income are for whether the household donated its survey fee to charity (at 10%) and for happiness (at 1%). To explore other predictions of the life-cycle model, we re-estimated Table 6 separately for low-and high-education groups, and for households whose heads are above and below the median age of 50, to see if 'own' responses to lottery income were larger among the old and poor. While interesting, the results may reveal more about the distinction between luxuries and necessities and age-related variation in a household's consumption priorities than the life cycle hypothesis per se: low-education households spend more of their lottery winnings on cars, and less on vacations than high-education households. Young households also spend more of their lottery winnings on cars than older households, but older households' non-car durables consumption is much more responsive to lottery income than younger households'.
The one outcome on which lottery and nonlottery income have the most dramatically different effects in Table 6 is happiness. Indeed, in contrast to our results for lottery winnings, and consistent with both Easterlin (1974) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) , higher total income is very strongly associated with happiness in a cross-section of households. One interpretation of these contrasting results is that the six-month lag between the PCL win and the survey date is too long: lottery winnings could affect own happiness, but the effects are very transitory, as argued by both Easterlin and by Kahneman et al. (2006) . Alternatively, the results of Gardner and Oswald (2007) suggest that six months might be too short: In their analysis of Britons who receive lottery wins between £1000 and £200,000 they find that in the year a prize is won, mental stress goes up, while in subsequent years lottery winners show less stress than non-winners. Finally, it is possible that happiness is simply more linked to long-run personal income than shortrun fluctuations, both because permanent income differences enable the household to take more happiness-improving actions, and perhaps because long-term income differences are more likely to be seen as earned and thus "legitimate".
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Social Effects of Lottery Winnings
We estimated the social effects of living near PCL winners using all the indicators of neighbors' winnings summarized in Table 2 , but report only the results using four representative indicators in rows 3-6 of Table 6 Table 6 provides quite robust evidence of social effects of neighbors' winnings on PCL participation and disposition of the survey fee, but for most consumption items, no effects are found. An outcome of particular interest is happiness. According to column 14 in Table 6 , living in a winning postcode (not winning oneself) has no effect on household's happiness; more precisely we say with 95% confidence that living in a winning postcode (but not winning oneself) reduces happiness by no more than .11 of a standard deviation, and that it raises happiness by no more than .07 of a standard deviation. This result contrasts with Luttmer's (2005) . However, his result refers to effects of neighbors' earnings on happiness, which have a bigger permanent component than lottery winnings, and neighbors' earnings are not randomly assigned in his analysis.
The absence of an effect of exogenous changes in neighbors' incomes on own happiness in our data is also consistent with Stevenson and Wolfers' (2008) claim that relative incomes do not have large effects on happiness.
Finally, consistent with the ITE estimates from the previous section, Table 6 suggests the presence of social effects for two aspects of consumption that are arguably most visible to one's neighbors: exterior home renovations and cars. While the evidence for the former is confined to one regression specification, the evidence for cars is more 21 robust. Statistically significant effects are found for all four indicators of car consumption, and for three of our four measures of neighbors' winnings. These estimates of social effects on car consumption are substantial in size. For example, having an immediate neighbor win the PCL raises the probability that a household will buy a car in the next six months by close to 7 percentage points and reduces the mean age of its main car at the survey date by half a year (about a 7 percent decline). For two car consumption indicators (total car efficiency units and the age of the main car), the estimated effects of an immediate neighbor winning the PCL are very similar in size to the estimated own effects of winning €10,000; for the incidence of car purchases in the past six months it is actually greater than the own effect. Thus, relative to the fact that the one-time lottery win has only a modest effect on households' own consumption choices (consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis), these effects are substantial in magnitude.
A final possible concern with the results in Table 6 is the possibility that our procedure for selecting 'control' postcodes for the winning codes may have induced some nonrandomness. (In most cases we simply selected all adjoining codes, but occasionally some discretion was involved.) Although the available evidence suggests that our randomization was successful, we also tested the robustness of our results to the selection of non-winning postcodes by removing the codegroup fixed effects from the regressions in Table 6 . In regressions without fixed effects, we are comparing the behavior of households in winning codes to households in all non-winning postcodes in our sample.
The results (reported on the paper's website) were virtually unchanged. In sum, our regression estimates of social effects confirm the nonparametric results reported in sections 5 and 6.
Conclusion
We have used the natural experiment associated with the Dutch postcode lottery (PCL) to study the own and social effects of a temporary, unexpected income shock equal to about eight months of income on households' consumption behavior and self-reported happiness. The natural experiment provided by the PCL has a number of advantages, including exogeneity of the income shock to a household's residential neighbors and the 22 absence of direct causal effects of household mobility. According to our estimates, the effects of a lottery prize on winners are confined largely to cars and other consumer durables. This finding is consistent with a permanent income model in which households adjust the timing of their durables purchases to smooth consumption, or with mental accounting models in which households are reluctant to borrow from accounts viewed as 'assets'. In addition, as predicted by simple models of transfers in kind, the vast majority of households who exogenously receive a large, in-kind transfer (a new BMW) converted that prize into other goods or savings, despite the transactions cost or tax penalty associated with doing so.
We do find robust evidence for effects of lottery prizes on neighbors of winners, but only for one good --car consumption--which is likely to be easily, and repeatedly, visible to a household's neighbors. Higher-income households in our data are significantly happier than other households, but lottery winnings do not make households happier, nor do they make neighboring households less happy. The latter two results, based on genuinely exogenous shocks to own and neighbors' incomes, would seem to present challenges for both relative inoome-based and for 'habituation' models of happiness.
What models of consumer behavior might explain the social effects estimated in our data? While it is tempting to interpret our estimates as reflective of a psychological need to "keep up with the van den Bergs" 26 , we note that they could also be driven by other factors. For example, social spillovers in car consumption could be driven by Finally, we note that, despite the lack of detectable own spending responses for most consumption items, our results contain some encouraging news for fiscal policies such as unexpected tax rebates designed to stimulate consumer spending in developed economies: To the extent that such 'stimulus' policies aim specifically at durables (a well known recent example is the U.S.'s "cash for clunkers" subsidies for automobile purchases) our results suggest that they may have substantial own effects, as well as significant social multiplier effects (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 2003) . These social multipliers are distinct from, and would presumably operate in addition to, the usual Keynesian multipliers that have been studied in this context. Notes: Statistically significant differences between columns 1 and 3 and between columns 2 and 4 denoted by ***, **, and * for p < .01, .05, and .10 respectively (198 obs.) .015 among BMW winners (25 obs.) .160
Notes: Statistically significant differences between columns 1 and 3 and between columns 2 and 4 denoted by ***, **, and * for p < .01, .05, and .10 respectively. See Table 1 for sample sizes. Table 4 : Car Consumption Indicators for PCL Nonparticipants *, **, ***: statistically different from column 1 at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively †, † †, † † †: statistically different from column 2 at at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively Sample sizes in parentheses. 
.354
.428*** †
.444*** † †
(1) (2) (3) 
.451*
.376
.485** (100) Notes: Rows 1-3 show coefficients on own winnings, own non-lottery income and a winning postcode dummy, all included in the same regression. Rows 4-6 show the coefficients on alternative measures of neighbors' winnings when they are substituted for the winning postcode dummy in the regression shown in rows 1-3 (coefficients on own winnings and nonlottery income do not change much when different indicators of neighbors' winnings are used). All specifications also include a fixed effect for lottery participation, a quadratic in the number of tickets purchased, and controls for the presence of a partner, number of children and its square, age and its square, education, and a full set of codegroup fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on postcodes. Total winnings (after tax) are measured in euros/10000 and include BMW values. "Got Car" means that one of the household's currently-owned cars was acquired in the six months since the lottery date. See previous tables for variable definitions. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 F-Tests fail to reject equality of the Lottery Winnings and NonLottery Income coefficients for all consumption items but two: Happiness (p=.0097) and Charity (p=.0910).
